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THE POLITICS AND LIMITATIONS
OF COUNTING THE DEAD:
A REVIEW OF TWO MORTALITY STUDIES ON IRAQ
Heba Fatma Morayef *
INTRODUCTION
'We don't do body counts '--General Tommy Franks, March 23, 20021
Any discussion of mortality rates in Iraq is destined to be a highly
politicized and controversial one. The publication of every new study
on the death toll in Iraq is greeted with strong denials or enthusiastic
media coverage by pro-war and anti-war camps, as well as vigorous
debate in the scientific community. As the legitimacy of US and UK
intervention in Iraq continues to be called into question, the political
implications of high civilian casualties in post-war Iraq are especially
significant due to the ongoing lack of security and deepening
humanitarian crisis. Yet, those governments best-placed to release
statistics on civilian casualties refuse to do so.
In light of the lack of a comprehensive health information
system in Iraq to provide data on mortality rates, epidemiological
household surveys are the best available mechanism. The following is
a review of two of the most prominent mortality studies conducted in
post-war Iraq: the first is Mortality After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: A
Cross-SectionalCluster Sample Survey, along with its supplement The
Human Cost of War,2 conducted by the Bloomberg School of Public
* Heba Fatma Morayef is a researcher in human rights, specializing in the Middle
East. She holds an LLM in Public International Law from the London School of

Economics and a B.A. in Political Science with Specialization in Public International

Law from the American University in Cairo.
1 Edward Epstein, Success in Afghan War Hard to Gauge, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON.,

Mar. 23, 2002, at Al.

2 Gilbert Burnham, Riyadh Lafta, Shannon Doocy, & Les Roberts, Mortality Before
and After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: A Cross-Sectional Cluster Sample, 368 LANCET
1421, 1421-1428 (Oct. 2006) [hereinafter "Lancet Study"]; GILBERT BURNHAM ET
AL., JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY BLOOMBERG SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH & THE
MIT INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, THE HUMAN COST OF THE WAR IN

IRAQ: A MORTALITY STUDY, 2002-2006, available at http://mit.edu/humancostiraq/
reports/human-cost-war-101106.pdf (Oct. 11, 2006) (last visited April 5, 2008)
[hereinafter "The Human Cost of War"].
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Health at Johns Hopkins University together with the School of
Medicine at Al Mustansiriya University and published in The Lancet on
October 2006 (hereinafter The Lancet study). The second is the
Violence-Related Mortality in Iraqfrom 2002 to 2006 study, which was
conducted by the World Health Organization (WHO)-Iraqi Ministry of
Health sponsored Iraq Family Health Survey Study Group (hereinafter
the IFHS study) and published in the New EnglandJournalof Medicine
on January 9, 2008. Another project, the Iraq Body Count which relies
on passive surveillance of the media will be examined below for
comparative purposes.
I. THE HUMAN COST OF WAR IN IRAQ- A MORTALITY
STUDY
A.

Background

4
The successor to a 2004 survey also published in the Lancet,
this study was commissioned by the Centre for International Studies at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and was approved by the
Committee on Human Research at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg
School of Public Health. A group of male and female Iraqi medical
doctors from Al Mustansirya University in Baghdad conducted the
survey between May and July 2006 under the supervision of one of the
authors, Riyadh Lafta. After obtaining the consent of the head of each
household, they made queries about births, deaths, and migrations into
and out of the household since January 1, 2002, recording deaths which
had occurred between January 1, 2002 and the day of the interview in
July 2006, only if the person had lived in the household for three
continuous months. Some of the supporting data was made available
subsequently; however, the security risk to the interviewees meant that
no data that would identify them was released

B.

Methodology

The authors argue that population-based survey methods, in this
case a standard cluster survey method, are the recommended method
for measuring deaths in conflict situations. Fifty households were
identified through random selection based on population size, with
3 Iraq Family Health Survey Study Group, Violence-Related Mortality in Iraqfrom
2002 to 2006, 385 NEW ENG. J. MED. 483 (2008) [hereinafter "IFHS study"].
4 Lancet Study, supra note 2.
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Baghdad's population 6,500,0005 being assigned twelve clusters, while
Basra and Sulamaniyah had three clusters each. Forty households in
each of the forty-seven cluster sites in sixteen of the eighteen
governorates in Iraq were visited and interviewed about household
deaths which occurred between January 2002 and July 2006. Three
were subsequently excluded from the study when it was discovered that
they had been misattributed.
The total number of households
interviewed was 1849; they contained 12801 individuals.
The
interviewers would start at the identified house and would then move
on to the nearest thirty-nine houses.
C.

Findings

The standard cluster survey method was used to determine a
death rate for the entire country, which was found to be an average of
13.2 deaths per 1000 persons per year for the period of 2002-2006.6
This number, the 'crude death rate' of all deaths from all causes, was
then modified by subtracting the 'baseline' death rate in order to
determine 'excess deaths,' i.e. those which would not have been
expected to take place had the war not happened. The baseline death
rate of 5.5 deaths per 1000 persons per year was based on the survey of
the period between January 2002 and the invasion in March 2003.
Excess deaths in post-invasion Iraq were found to be:
March 2003-April 2004:
2.6 deaths/1,000/year
May 2004-May 2005:
5.6 deaths/1,000/year
June 2005-June 2006:
14.2 deaths/ 1,000/year
7.8 deaths/1,000/year 7
Overall post-invasion:
This rate yields an average of 7.2/1000/year, which when applied to the
population of 26.1 million, produces the estimate of 654,965 excess
deaths in Iraq as a consequence of the war from all causes. 8 When nonviolent deaths are subtracted from this total, the number of deaths in
post-war Iraq due to violent causes becomes 601,027, which is
5 The

authors relied upon 2004 estimates from the Living Conditions Survey, United

Nations Development Program, Iraq Ministry of Planning and Development
Cooperation. Iraq 2004, Vol 1: Tabulation Report (UNDP 2005).
6 The

death rate for every 1000 persons per year was the following: between March
2003-April 2004: 7.5 deaths/1,000/year; May 2004-May 2005: 10.9 deaths/
1,000/year; June 2005-June 2006: 19.8 deaths/1,000/year; Overall post-invasion: 13.2
deaths/1,000/year.
7 THE HUMAN COST OF WAR, supranote 2, at 7.
8 Lancet Study, supra note 2, at 1426.
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approximately 2.5% of Iraq's population. 9 The range of plausible
values lies between 426,369-793,663.10
The proportion of violent and non-violent death rates was
examined with 'non-violent' defined as "not due to intentional
violence," which would include death in traffic accidents. The authors
write that pre-invasion deaths were "almost entirely non-violent
deaths;" ' ' however, this would need to be verified by comparison with
murder rates and the incidence of honor killings and extra-judicial
executions in pre-invasion Iraq.12 Apart from the expected sharp
increase in violent deaths post-invasion, what is interesting to note is an
increase in non-violent deaths starting in June 2005 at a rate of 1.2
deaths/1000/year. 13 While this may not be a dramatic increase, the
authors suggest that this may point to deterioration in health services
and access to these services. Deterioration in health services is caused
in part by the violence against medical staff that has been occurring,
and the gap caused by the brain drain of medical staff during the
Saddam Hussein regime.
A recently released report by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) notes that more than
2,200 doctors and nurses have been killed since 2003, and 20,000 14of the
34,000 doctors who were registered in 1991 have left the country.
1.

Causes of Death

The team conducting the survey also asked household members
about the cause of death of the individual. The most common cause
throughout was gunshots, with air strikes accounting for a high
proportion of deaths at the beginning, and then later, car bombs
becoming increasingly frequent.
The authors' assertion that "from the accounts of households, it
was almost always possible to identify the weapon or type of ordinance

9

1d.

10Id.
" THE HUMAN COST OF WAR, supra note 2, at 7.
12See e.g. Iraq: Victims of Systematic Repression, Amnesty International,November

24, 1999, available at www.aniesty.org and Human Rights Watch World Report
Entries on Iraq, available at www.hrw.org/ doc?t=-mideast&c=iraq (last visited April
15, 2008).
13 THE HUMAN COST OF WAR, supra note 2, at 7.

14 International Committee of the Red Cross, Iraq: No Let-Up in the Humanitarian
Crisis, March 17, 2008, availableat www.icrc.org (last visited April 24, 2008).
'5 Lancet Study, supra note 2, at 1423.
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responsible for the death of the household member"' 16 is problematic. It
is not clear how the household members would have known for certain
what had caused the death of their relative with the possibility of lack
of information or potential bias of the interviewee putting their
responses into question. Although the authors were conscious of the
limitations of trying to identify the cause of death in this manner,
stating that there were many cases where the cause was unclear, their
solution of only recording deaths "when the household was certain that
the death was a consequence of coalition action'' 17 is not sufficiently
convincing, since, as they said themselves, they had "no independent
method for identifying the parties responsible for these deaths."' 8 The
extent to which one can rely upon the findings with regards to the
increase in the proportion of deaths attributed to groups other than the
coalition forces may be subject to the same risk of bias depending on
the political affiliations of the household.
2.

Attribution of Responsibility for the Deaths

While the question of who is responsible for these 'excess
deaths' was not properly examined by the authors because it was not
the main focus of the study, some observations can be made based on
the responses on the findings as to the causes of death. The study
included statistics on coalition-related deaths, which represented 31%
of all violent deaths, with gunshots amounting to 56%, airstrikes to
13%, while the source of 45% remains unknown.
Ultimately, correlating deaths to operations conducted by
coalition forces or irregular Iraqi forces is very difficult, because the
information is not made public by either. Coalition forces "don't do
body counts"'19 but what is known, as John Tirman writes in Annex F to
the Lancet study, is that coalition forces continue to conduct large scale
"close air support" of ground operations although it is not known how
much ordnance is dropped. 20 This, combined with reports of assertive
rules of engagement, could provide substantiation to the high death
rates reported. While little is known about the military capabilities of
the militias and insurgents, the clear increase in gunshot wounds from
June 2005 onwards may lead to the conclusion that an increasing
16 THE

HuMAN COST OF WAR, supra note 2, at

8.

7 1d. at9.

'8Id. at 9.
19Epstein,
20

supra note 1.

THE HUMAN COST OF WAR, supra note 2, at Annex F.
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proportion of excess deaths is due to the rise in sectarian violence. This
conclusion is due to the use of small arms and the practice of
assassinations that are characteristic of the irregular forces in Iraq.
II. VIOLENCE-RELATED MORTALITY IN IRAQ FROM
2002 TO 2006
A. Background
In November 2006, Iraqi Health Minister Ali al-Shemari
disputed the findings of the'21Lancet study saying "this is an exaggerated
number. I think 150 is ok.
The study Violence-Related Mortality in Iraq from 2002 to
2006 was conducted by the Iraqi Ministry of Health together with the
Ministry of Planning and development and was given technical support
by the WHO. The New England Journalof Medicine published it on
January 31, 2008.22 The survey was carried out by employees of the
Iraqi Health Ministry and coordinated by the WHO office in Baghdad.
The period examined was January 2002 to June 2006, to allow for
comparison with the results of the Lancet study.
B. Methodology
The study looked at violence-related death rates asked
household members for the sex, age, and time and place of death of the
individual. They also inquired whether the individual had received
medical
attention prior to death and what the main cause of death
3
was.

2

The study relied upon the same cluster methodology with a
larger target sample size of 10,860 households in 1086 clusters, which
were nationally representative. The team of surveyors successfully
visited 89.4% of the identified household clusters, with a response rate
of 96.2%.24 Of the remaining 3.8%, 0.7% were absent, 0.4% did not
wish to complete the questionnaire, and 1.1% were vacant.25

Steven R. Hurt, Iraqi Official: 150,000 Civilians Dead,
November 10, 2006.
22 See generally, IFHS study, supra note 3.
23 Id at 485.
24 Id. at 486.
21

25 id.

ASSOCIATED PRESS,
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C. Findings
The survey produced a violence-related death rate of 1.67 per
1000 persons per year which translates into 151,000 deaths from March
2003 to June 2006.26 The range of statistical uncertainty lies between
104,000 to 223,000. The average rate for death from any cause postinvasion was 5.73/1000 persons/year, which increased by 5% after
adjustment for missing clusters in Anbar and Baghdad to 6.01/1000
persons/year. 2 7 Adjustment of violence-related death increased it from
0.80 to 1.09 per 1000 person-years, which represents a 13.6%
increase.28 The survey determined a more significant increase of
around 60% in the non-violent death rate from 3.07/1000 persons/year
in the pre-invasion period to 4.92 for the post-invasion period, but did
not provide any further explanation.29
III. THE IRAQ BODY COUNT
For comparative purposes, a third project, which must be looked
at in conjunction with the two under examination here, is the Iraq Body
Count (IBC), an independent UK-based project, which counts only
civilian deaths reported in the media. 30 Their goals are to make the
knowledge of war deaths available to all, since "war is an abomination
whose defining characteristic is the organized killing of humans
and
31
our common humanity demands the recording of war deaths.",
The IBC records deaths of civilians caused by violence; this
includes deaths as a result of military action and attacks by insurgents,
as well as a result of criminal action in the context of the breakdown of
law and order after the invasion. The IBC records a death only when
the incident is recorded by at least two independent media sources.32
The Iraq Body Count's latest figure for documented civilian
deaths from violence since 2003 until this day is 82,408-89,928. 33 For

Id. at 484.
Id. at 489.
28
Id.at 489.
29 Id. at 490.
30 Iraq Body Count Website, About Us: Methods, www.iraqbodycount.org (last
26

27

visited April 6, 2008).
31id.
32

Id.

33 Id.
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the period comparable to the IFHS and Lancet reports, the IBC's total
was between 43,546 and 48,343.3
As they freely admit, the majority of civilian casualties go
unreported by the media and also by officials. In the case of Iraq,
however, the IBC faces additional challenges due to the overcentralization of the media in Baghdad and lack of media in certain
other areas of Iraq due to security concerns. While American and
British casualties are immediately reported and given wide media
coverage, with the most recent estimate of US casualties being 4000, 35
news of civilians dying in Iraq is no longer newsworthy, unless it
occurs on a significant enough scale to interest the media.
An additional potentially limiting factor is the fact that the IBC
relies mainly on the Western media and only certain Arabic media
sources that are translated into English. This creates an imbalance,
because it excludes possible local Arabic media, which report on Iraqi
casualties in the less accessible areas. As the IBC's July 2005 report
states, three press agencies Reuters, Agence France Presse, and
Associated Press, provide over one third of all reports. 36 While these
are reputable wires, they do not have enough correspondents on the
ground spread out across Iraq to be providing accurate and
representative reporting on civilian casualties, let alone to be reporting
on the same incidents to 37fulfill IBC's requirement of confirmation by
two independent sources.
What it can be useful for, however, is for identification of trends
in death rates, by comparing the reported death rates since the invasion.
It is also interesting to note the list of primary sources most frequently
relied upon by the media in reporting deaths. These are primarily
mortuaries, medics, Iraqi officials, eyewitnesses and police, followed
by relatives, coalition, journalists, and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs).

See Table on Iraq Body Count Website, Analysis: From the Numbers: Civilian
Deathsfrom Violence in 2007, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2007/
(last visited March 21, 2008).
" US MilitaryIraq Toll Hits 4, 000, BBC NEWS, March 24, 2008.
34

Iraq Body Count, A Dossier of Civilian Casualties 2003-2005, available at
www.iraqbodycount.org (last visited May 12, 2008).
36
37

id..
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DISCUSSION POINTS FROM THE TWO STUDIES
A. Limitations of the methodology in times of conflict

Epidemiological cluster sample studies are resorted to in
countries in conflict where a systematic registration of deaths does not
exist and have been used in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Kosovo, and Darfur, 38 by United Nations agencies and also by the US
government. Simple random sampling would yield more accurate
results; yet, this is usually not feasible in times of conflict because of
the heightened security risk. Cluster sample studies are more accurate
the larger the number of households surveyed and as long as the
selection of clusters is done methodically.
The IFHS study acknowledges the fact that household surveys
are always subject to biases, even in peacetime, and that in times of
conflict limitations on movement due to security risks makes data
collection even more difficult, making traditional models of adjustment
inapplicable.39 In the case of Iraq, security risks are a major
consideration and surveyors have died while performing their tasks,
including one of the IFHS study co-authors, Louay Hakki Rasheed,
who was killed on August 2, 2007 while on his way to work.4 °
The IFHS team was unable to visit 10.6% of the selected
clusters because of security problems; 61.7% of these clusters were in
Anbar and 26.9 in Baghdad. To address this deficiency, the team relied
upon figures from the Iraq Body Count to estimate a ratio of the death
rates in different provinces. 4 1 This is problematic because, as
mentioned above, the Iraq Body Count itself suffers from
disproportionate reporting since the media tends to be based in certain
areas.
In addition, the clustering of violent deaths creates the risk that
samples are not necessarily representative because certain streets of a
particular town may be more dangerous than others. A research team
38

Les Roberts et al., Mortality in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo

(International Rescue Committee, 2001); P. B. Spiegel & P. Salama, War and
mortality in Kosovo, 1998-99: an epidemiological testimony, 355 LANCET 2204,
2204-09 (2000).
39 IFHS study, supranote 3, at 485.
40 Lawrence K. Altman & Richard A. Oppel, WHO. Says Iraq Civilian Death Toll
Higher Than Cited, N.Y. TIMEs, January 10, 2008, available at www.nytimes.com/

2008/01/1 0/world/midleeast/10 casualties.html.
41IFHS study, supra note 3, at 486.

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 11.3:413

composed of physicists Sean Gourley and Neil Johnson at Oxford
University and Michael Spagat at Royal Holloway University criticized
the Lancet study for "main street bias,' 4 2 since houses on the bigger
streets were at a higher risk of exposure to violence and this would
therefore result in an inflation of casualty rates. Lancet study author
Gilbert Burnham denied that this was a factor saying that 28% of the
households surveyed were in rural areas, in keeping with the population
spread.43
B. Implications of Lack of Stability of the Population
One of the main problems with household surveys conducted in
times of conflict is that the basic assumption of a stable population does
not exist.
The random selection of clusters will only yield
representative results if data on population is up to date and if the
population is stable. The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that at least 4.2 million Iraqis have left
their homes; 2.2 million remain internally displaced within Iraq; and at
least 2 million have crossed the border to neighboring states such as
Syria and Jordan.44 For purposes of any household survey, the overall
figure of 4.2 million is relevant not only, because it affects the overall
population but also since the distribution of clusters relies on
population data for the different governorates.45 If these are no longer
accurate, with as much as 15 % of the total population in movement,
then the extent to which the clusters are representative becomes
questionable.
Both studies relied upon statistics on population obtained from
the Iraqi Ministry of Planning based on the 1997 census, which had
been updated in 2004 for the Iraq Living Conditions Survey. 46 For
Kurdistan, the IFHS obtained data from the Statistical Offices in the
region. The Lancet study acknowledges that the population size it
42

Sean Gourley et al., Conflict Mortality Surveys, available at http://www.rhul.

ac.uk/Economics/Research/conflict-analysis/iraq-mortality/ (last visited March 17,
2007).
43 Sarah Boseley, UK Scientists Attack Lancet Study Over Death Toll, THE
GUARDIAN, October 24, 2006.
44 UNHCR Iraq Website, http://www.unhcr.org/iraq.html (last visited March 17,
2007).
45 See Lancet Study, supra note 2, at 1422, Table 2.
46 Living Conditions Survey, United Nations Development Program, Iraq Ministry
of
Planning and Development Cooperation, Iraq 2004, Vol 1: Tabulation Report (UNDP
2005).
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obtained from the Ministry of Planning does not reflect migration,
however, they do not consider this a factor, which would put their
findings into question saying that "it is unlikel 7 that this would have
occurred at a scale necessary to affect findings."
The IFHS study factored in migration by adjusting projected
midyear population numbers for net migration; however, this would not
have addressed the internal movement of displaced people, which
would affect the cluster samples.
Household dissolution is another common challenge for
household surveys in the context of a conflict, when the death of one or
several members of a household causes the family to move. The
Lancet team sought to identify any household, which had ceased to
exist in the survey period to come up with an estimate of "survivor
bias" and adjust the results accordingly. 4 8 The IFHS study recognizes
that underreporting is a common limitation of household surveys,
especially with regards to household dissolution, and in this case they
estimated 62% completeness in the level of reporting by looking at the
age distribution of the households and applying the growth balance
method.4 9
C. Accusations of Under-Reporting and Inflating Findings
Hospitals and morgues in post-war Iraq are not equipped with a
comprehensive registration system to ensure that all deaths are
recorded. Not all those who die are taken to the morgue, and the only
morgue that regularly releases information is the one in central
Baghdad. In addition, the bodies of those who die in bombings are
given to the family to bury in keeping with Muslim custom of
immediate burial.
On November 10, 2006, Iraqi Health Minister Ali al-Shemari
told The Associated Press (AP) that there had been a total of 150,000
deaths since 2003, based on an estimate of 100 bodies per day brought
to morgues and hospitals.5 ° In the same report however, AP quoted Dr
Abdul-Razzaq al-Obaidi, the head of the Baghdad central morgue as
saying that he was receiving "as many as 60 violent death victims each
day at his facility alone and this did not include those taken by relatives
47 THE HUMAN COST OF THE WAR IN IRAQ, supranote 2, at 11.
48
1 d.at 5.
49 IFHS study, supra note 3, at 486.
50 Steven R. Hurst, Iraqi Official: 150,000 Civilians Dead, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS,

November 10, 2006.
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from the scene of attack and buried immediately.", 5 1 Gilbert Burnham
and Les Roberts state that "surveillance by monitoring media reports or
bodies in the morgue captures only a small percentage of the deaths
occurring, particularly when the Iraqi health-information system and
infrastructure are practically nonexistent," pointing out that in July
2006 the Iraqi Ministry of Health reported 0 violent deaths in the Anbar
Province, in spite of evidence to the contrary in footage in media
reports.52
While both studies have relatively similar findings on the
overall excess death rates, the Lancet study attributes 91% to violence,
while the IFHS study sets that only at 18%.53 Les Roberts, co-author of
the Lancet study, believes this might have been due to the fact that the
study workers were government employees and that this may have
deterred some households from reporting all the violence-related deaths
that had occurred,54 a fair point given the fact that it is conceivable that
many families may not have wanted to report the death of relatives in
an incident which involved the insurgency. John Tirman, director of
the Centre for International Studies at MIT who commissioned the
study, also points out that the Minister of
Health was known to be an
55
affiliate of Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.
In terms of the rate of violence, the findings of the IFHS study
show a steady increase from 2003 to 2006, while the Lancet study
shows a sharp increase in the years of 2005-2006. Roberts argues that
a comparison of the degree of increase with other sources, such as
Baghdad morgue data and Pentagon data on operations in the last year
points towards the accuracy of the Lancet study.56 The authors of the
Lancet study argue that they are confident they did not record any
deaths which did not occur because in 92% of the cases the household
was able to show the team a death certificate.57

51
52

Id.
Gilbert Burnham & Les Roberts, Counting Corpses: The Lancet number crunchers

respond to Slate's FredKaplan, SLATE, November 20, 2006.
53 IFHS study, supranote 3, at 48.
54 Les Roberts, Comment on new Iraq mortality study, PSYCHE,

SCIENCE, & SOCIETY,
January 10, 2008, http://psychoanalystsopposewar.org/blog/2008/01/10/les-robertson-new-iraq-mortality-study/.
55 Hurst, supra note 50.
56 Lancet Study Author Assesses New Report on Iraqi Death
Toll, INSTITUTE FOR
PUBLIC ACCURACY, January 11, 2008, http://www.accuracy.org/newsrelease.php?art
icleld=1627.
57 Lancet Study, supra note 2, at
7.
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The findings of the IFHS survey result in an estimate of 128
violent deaths per day in the first year of the invasion, 115 per day in
the year following May 2004, and 126 per day from June 2005 to June
2006. 58 The Lancet study set violence-related daily death rate at 231
per day in the first year after the invasion, which by 2005 had risen to
491 per day. 59 The criticisms leveled at the Lancet study were mainly
that its pre-invasion death rate is too low, which then artificially
increases the excess death rate post-invasion,6 ° that the cluster sample
was too small, 6 1 and that the inadequacy of the timeframe has
problematic ethical implications for the team's relationship with the
interviewees. 62 Others, however, have defended the methodology itself
and the findings in the Lancet study,63 arguing that this is the best
estimate it is possible to obtain in the context of Iraq. Dr. David Rush,
an epidemiologist at Tufts University in Boston, said that "over the last
25 years, this sort of methodology has been used more and more often,
64
especially by relief agencies in times of emergency.',
Interestingly, a memo by the UK Ministry of Defense's chief
scientific advisor Sir Roy Anderson obtained by the BBC World
Service's Newshour program under the Freedom of Information Act,
advises the government not to dismiss the report, saying that "the study
design is robust and employs methods that are regarded as close to
'best practice' in this area, given the difficulties of data collection and
65
verification in the present circumstances in Iraq."

See IFHS study, supra note 3, at 491, table 4.
Id. at 491, figure lB.
60 Fred Kaplan, Number Crunching Taking another look at the Lancet's Iraq study,
58

59

SLATE, October 20, 2006.
61 Steven

E. Moore, 655,000 War Dead?A Bogus Study on Iraq Casualties,WALL ST.

J., October 18, 2006.
62

Madelyn Hsiao-Rei Hicks, Mortality after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: Were valid

and ethical field methods used in this survey?, Households in Conflict Network
Research Design Notes, University of Sussex Institute of Development Studies,
December 1, 2006.
63 Sir Richard Peto, Professor of Medical Statistics and Epidemiology
in the
University of Oxford, qtd in BBC Newsnight October 11, 2006; see The Iraq deaths
study was validand correct, THE AGE, October 21, 2006; David Brown, Study Claims
Iraq's 'Excess' Death Toll Has Reached 655,000, WASHINGTON POST, October 11,

2006 (quoting Ronald Waldman & Sarah Leah Whitson).

64
65

Iraq death rate estimates defended by researchers,REUTERS, October 21, 2006.
See Owen Bennett-Jones, Iraqi Death Survey "Was Robust," BBC WORLD

SERVICE, March 26, 2007.
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D. Who are the Dead?
The Lancet study notes that men account for almost all of the
violent deaths, which is echoed by the IFHS study that found that
violence is the main cause of death for men between fifteen and fiftynine years of age with death from injuries becoming the main cause of
death in the years after the invasion. 6 6 One of the reasons the IBC's
figures will always be much lower than that of the household surveybased estimates is that it records only civilian deaths, where in the case
of the Lancet and IFHS studies it was not possible to distinguish
between civilian and combatant deaths. This fact was cited by
Pentagon officials in their rejection of the findings of the Lancet study
was the fact that it did not distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, 67 thereby implying that it would be legitimate if
combatants died as a result of coalition action.
E. Acknowledging Inherent Biases
Due to the politically-fraught nature of the conflict and the
different agendas of the various parties, estimates that are free of bias
are virtually impossible to come by, since all households will have been
affected by the war in one way or another and have lost a relative as a
result. Therefore, it is highly likely that they will have strong feelings
about the conflict and possible that in interpreting the causes of the
death of their relative, these feelings might affect their perception of the
truth. This does not mean that the entire study is tainted, but it is not
realistic to expect a household survey to be free of bias.
Military forces and governments are in the best position to
provide the statistics; yet, they have a vested interest in not providing
data that shows they caused the death of large numbers of people. The
image of a democratic Iraq newly liberated by coalition forces is
tarnished by news of mass civilian deaths, and it is arguable that the US
and UK governments might wish to downplay the findings of the
Lancet report. Equally conceivable is that the current government of
Iraq would not welcome findings on a very high level of non-coalition66
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related violent death rate, since this would point to an inability to
protect the Iraqi civilian populations and a lack of effective control.
For the US and the UK, figures as high as those of the Lancet
would put into question the legitimacy of their campaign. President
Bush was dismissive of the Lancet's: "six hundred thousand or
whatever they guessed at is just, it's not credible. ' 68 Earlier, in
December 2005, President Bush had said that around 30,000 Iraqi had
died in the war. At a Pentagon briefing on October 11, 2007, General
George Casey, commander of multinational forces in Iraq, said "that
650,000 number seems way, way beyond any number that I have seen.
. I've not seen a number higher than 50,000. And so I don't give that
much credibility at all.",69 While Tony Blair's spokesman was
immediately critical of the report saying it was not accurate, in the
documents obtained by the BBC chief advisors warned that the
methodology itself was tried and tested and the implication in the brief
was that the Lancet estimate was likely to be right.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE FULL HUMAN COST OF WAR
Although wars are often measured by the number of civilian
casualties that are very difficult to obtain, the full human cost of war is
even more difficult to assess. The humanitarian crisis in Iraq is a
complex one and cannot be quantified into a number, which would
reflect the overall decrease in the quality of life that Iraqis have
experienced since 2003. A mortality study cannot reflect the full
human cost of war because it only attempts to count the dead and does
not address those who may have been wounded, including those who
may have lost all quality of life as a result of those wounds, or the
damage to civilian property or the overall affect on the lives of Iraqis
due to the lack of security. A recently published Amnesty International
report states that "today, more than two in three Iraqis do not have
access to safe drinking water, more than four in 10 live on less than a
dollar a day, half the population of working age is unemployed, and
eight million people need emergency aid to survive." 71 A rare ICRC
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report says the Iraq crisis "remains among the most critical in the
world., 72 Reports by the Unites Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
(UNAMI) on the human rights situation list incidents of targeted
killings, of illegal detention and of unfair trial. 73 The numbers we do
have, that of 4.2 million refugees who have fled Iraq, of those who do
not have access to health care or water and of those who have died
from violence be it 150,000 or 600,000 are enough to paint a bleak
picture of the reality of Iraq today and should serve as a reminder of
responsibility to the governments involved; the responsibility to
maintain security, to provide for basic needs, and to respect and ensure
human rights.
An estimate closer to the truth in Iraq might be obtained one
day, through improvement of the methodology and a decrease in
security risks to surveyors and through de-classification of information
in the hands of the US military and the Iraqi authorities. Until that
time, every new attempt to come up with an estimate that is closer to
the truth should not be dismissed out of hand but taken seriously and
examined respectfully. As Mohamed Ali, a WHO statistician and one
of the authors of the IFHS study, puts it: "assessment of the death toll
in conflict situations is extremely difficult and household survey results
have to be interpreted with caution ... however, in the absence of
comprehensive death registration and hospital reporting, household
surveys are the best we can do."7 4 The number of casualties is not the
only indicator of the suffering that has been inflicted on a civilian
population, which is supposed to be protected in any war and in whose
name the Iraq war has been justified, but it tends to be the indicator
which is cited most. The conflict in Rwanda is most often referred to
as the genocide in which 800,000 people were killed, although there is
some debate about the estimate there also.75 One could argue that it did
not matter whether genocide had occurred or whether it was 'merely' a
war crime or a crime against humanity. Yet one of the main reasons
72
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international criminal tribunals spend several years studying individual
cases to determine the nature of the crimes committees is that they
believe that victims have a right to truth, to an accurate historical
account of the full extent of the crimes that took place and that inflicted
suffering on them. By the same token, the Iraqi people have the right
to know how many people have died, since the majority of the
population have been helpless bystanders, while first a dictator, then
multi-national forces, and now insurgents and irregular forces cause the
death of large numbers of people.
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